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Questions about the relationship between
language and thought have long fas-
cinated psychologists, philosophers, and
the general public. One specific ques-
tion is the extent to which verbal labels
causally impact cognitive processes—how
does calling an object by a particular
name influence the way people categorize
it; how does knowing words for men-
tal states influence our reasoning about
the minds of others; how does learn-
ing and using words like left influence
our navigation behavior? One way to
learn how the words we use to label
objects, mental states, or locations affect
our thoughts is to increase or decrease the
ease with which we can use these words
and observe outcomes of these manipula-
tions on “non-linguistic” tasks. For exam-
ple, if the word left enables us to remember
which way to turn, preventing its activa-
tion might be expected to disrupt navi-
gation. Manipulating the labeling process
(and the engagement of language more
broadly) is therefore very useful in explor-
ing how language influences cognition.
In this paper, we review two methodolo-
gies for implementing linguisticmanipula-
tions: verbal interference and transcranial
direct current stimulation (tDCS), and
discuss what we can learn about the role of
language in cognitive processes from this
line of research.
VERBAL INTERFERENCE
The primarymethod for manipulating lin-
guistic activity is the use of verbal inter-
ference. The logic of verbal interference is
well summarized by Winawer et al. (2007)
in the context of studying the effects of
language on color perception:
“[I]f linguistic processes play an
active, online role in perceptual tasks,
then a verbal dual task, but not a
non-linguistic dual task, should dimin-
ish the goluboy/siniy [light blue /
dark blue] category advantage found in
Russian speakers,” (Winawer et al., 2007,
p. 7781).
Winawer et al. reported that Russian
speakers appear to perceive a larger per-
ceptual distinction between light and dark
blues, consistent with a lexical differ-
ence between these categories in Russian.
One possibility is that these differences
stem from long-term perceptual learn-
ing caused by years of distinguishing col-
ors in one language (e.g., Özgen and
Davies, 2002). An alternative is that
the cross-linguistic perceptual differences
arise from online top-down influences of
language (e.g., Fonteneau and Davidoff,
2007; Lupyan, 2008). If true, then dis-
rupting these top-down effects in some
way may disrupt these online effects of
language eliminating the cross-linguistic
difference—the pattern observed in the
study. It is important to note that for ver-
bal interference to have some effect does
not require the involvement of language
to be strategic. Rather, the involvement
could be one of “the spontaneous but
unspoken use of lexical codes,” (Gilbert
et al., 2006, p. 489). On this account,
previous associations of using the word
blue to describe the color blue cause
the word to become reactivated when
the color is seen (Lupyan, 2012a,b). The
automatic recruitment of color labels
may temporarily warp the perceptual
space, producing cross-linguistic differ-
ences of the sort observed by Winawer
et al.
Using similar logic, verbal interference
has been used to argue for a role of lan-
guage in number concepts (Frank and
Barner, 2012), spatial memory (Hermer-
Vazquez et al., 1999), categorization
(Lupyan, 2009), and theory of mind
(Newton and de Villiers, 2007). A similar
logic underlies behavioral up-regulation
of linguistic processes through redun-
dant presentation of labels (e.g., Lupyan
et al., 2007) or overt self-directed speech
(Lupyan and Swingley, 2012). If inter-
nally generated labels support some
cognitive or perceptual process, then
redundant externally-presented labels can
be thought to up-regulate the linguistic
contribution and verbal interference to
down-regulate it.
Verbal interference has also been used
to examine mechanisms of developmental
change. For example, in a task requiring
participants to locate an object hidden
in the corner of a room, children rely
on the room’s shape, while adults use
one of the walls—painted in a distinct
color from the other walls—to find the
object (Hermer and Spelke, 1994; cf.
Twyman and Newcombe, 2010). While
developments in spatial language cor-
relate with developments in using the
wall as a landmark, this cannot tell us
whether language causally influences
spatial memory. In order to determine
whether language supports develop-
ment of spatial memory, Hermer-Vazquez
et al. (1999) used a verbal interference
paradigm. When adults performed the
task while shadowing speech, their per-
formance mirrored that of children’s.
Thus, in addition to improving our
understanding of how language affects
cognition in real-time, verbal interfer-
ence has improved our understanding of
how influences of language on cognition
develop.
However, the use of verbal interference
is not without problems. First, despite
being used for many years across many
domains, there is at present no work-
ing theory of verbal interference. Put
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bluntly: no one is sure how it works.
Its use is vaguely based on the notion
that language is a unitary system that
can be disrupted, but this assumption
is potentially problematic given the degree
to which language-related activity is
distributed both anatomically (Jung-
Beeman, 2005) and functionally, e.g.,
syntax and semantics, rather than being
entirely dissociable systems, tightly inter-
act (MacDonald et al., 1994). Additionally,
there is little agreement as to what consti-
tutes verbal interference. Researchers have
used numerous tasks, with little theoret-
ical basis for choosing one over another.
Tasks falling under the umbrella of ver-
bal interference have included: rehearsing
multi-digit numbers for later memory
tests (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2006; Lupyan,
2009), repeating the letters “a,b,c” (e.g.,
Emerson and Miyake, 2003); alternating
between naming months and days (e.g.,
Baddeley et al., 2001), making rhyme judg-
ments (Roberson et al., 2007), answering
factual questions such as “What is your
name?” (e.g., Hatano et al., 1977), and
repeating text, known as speech shadow-
ing (Hermer-Vazquez et al., 1999; Frank
and Barner, 2012). These interference
tasks differ both in general difficulty and
the ease with which performance can be
assessed. For example, an interference task
with a memory component gives an indi-
cation of how well participants rehearsed
information—a proxy for howmuch effort
was put into the verbal task—repetition
of “a,b,c” does not. Such inconsistencies
makes it hard (1) to infer why verbal
interference sometimes interferes with
primary task performance and sometimes
does not and (2) to assess what aspect
of language is recruited in the primary
task which, when interfered with, disrupts
performance.
A final problemwith verbal interference
is that it requires participants to perform
two tasks simultaneously. It is therefore
necessary to use a control interference
task to determine which changes in pri-
mary task performance stem from manip-
ulation to specifically linguistic processes
and which stem from having to perform
two tasks. Control tasks also vary widely
across experiments: from tests of visu-
ospatial memory (e.g., Gilbert et al., 2006;
Lupyan, 2009) to foot tapping (Baddeley
et al., 2001; Emerson and Miyake, 2003),
and rhythm-shadowing (Hermer-Vazquez
et al., 1999). Importantly, unless interfer-
ence tasks are equated in all ways except
for their “verbality,” little can be said
about the role of language in the pri-
mary task. For example, it has been argued
that verbal, but not non-verbal interfer-
ence disrupted performance on a false-
belief task (Newton and de Villiers, 2007).
However, when the interference tasks were
better equated for difficulty, both were
similarly disruptive (Dungan and Saxe,
2012). Additionally, because verbal inter-
ference uses a dual-task paradigm, par-
ticipants can exert different amounts of
effort into the tasks. Such differential
effort is difficult both to measure and
control.
Despite its appeal, verbal interfer-
ence paradigms have clear shortcomings.
Below, we outline an alternative way of
perturbing linguistic processes that solve
some of the shortcomings, and advo-
cate for systematic cross-method compar-
isons of linguistic perturbation methods
to more fully inform our understanding
of how language augments cognition and
perception.
TRANSCRANIAL DIRECT CURRENT
STIMULATION
One way to avoid some challenges posed
by verbal interferences is by manipulating
language processing without using sec-
ondary tasks through the use of non-
invasive brain stimulation. Here, we focus
on one such method—tDCS a painless
method of regulating cortical excitabil-
ity through weak electrical current to
the scalp—that allows the experimenter
to subtly up- and down-regulate neu-
ral activity over cortical areas impli-
cated in language processing. For example,
using tDCS to up-regulate activity over
Wernicke’s area (associated with aspects
of labeling, particularly comprehension of
word meaning; e.g., Price, 2000) is asso-
ciated with increased ability to map novel
words to pictures (Flöel et al., 2008) using
it to up-regulate activity over Broca’s area
(associated with linguistic processes such
as speech production; e.g., Gernsbacher
and Kaschak, 2003) is associated with
increased artificial grammar learning (de
Vries et al., 2010).
Similar to using verbal interference,
using tDCS to study linguistic influences
on cognition assumes that language is
a system that can be selectively per-
turbed. However, tDCS avoids the need
to use dual task paradigms. The par-
ticipant simply performs the main task
while undergoing tDCS which, depend-
ing on the electrode arrangement, either
up- or down-regulates cortical activity
in targeted regions. Up-regulating activ-
ity is theoretically analogous to behav-
ioral up-regulation through presentation
of overt labels (Lupyan, 2008) or behav-
ioral self-directed speech (Lupyan and
Swingley, 2012); down-regulating activ-
ity is theoretically analogous to verbal
interference.
Recently, Lupyan et al. (2012) exam-
ined effects of tDCS on non-verbal cate-
gorization, showing that down-regulating
activity over Broca’s area was associ-
ated with impairments in the ability
to form categories that required selec-
tively representing specific perceptual fea-
tures to the exclusion of others, e.g.,
GREEN THINGS, a deficit similar to
one shown by individuals performing ver-
bal interference (Lupyan, 2009) or by
those with language impairments such as
aphasia (Davidoff and Roberson, 2004;
Lupyan and Mirman, 2013). In avoid-
ing pitfalls of a dual task design, how-
ever, Lupyan and colleagues’ tDCS study
allows for more definitive conclusions
about mechanisms by which language
might affect categorization because par-
ticipants all completed the same task,
and between-group differences can be
linked to changes in neural activity in
a particular cortical region providing at
least a foothold for starting to connect
behavioral data on the role of language
in categorization to particular neural
mechanisms.
IMPORTANT FUTURE
CONSIDERATIONS
Although tDCS may be well-suited for
manipulating linguistic activity, at present
there are no direct comparisons of tDCS
to verbal interference. It would be use-
ful to know whether domains in which
we have seen effects of verbal interfer-
ence on performance are affected by tDCS
over areas associated with language pro-
cesses and whether domains in which we
have not previously seen effects are sim-
ilarly unaffected. For example, tDCS can
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be used to determine if language-related
cortical regions shown to be recruited
in non-verbal color-judgment tasks (e.g.,
Ting Siok et al., 2009) are causally impli-
cated by showing perturbations with tDCS
have behavioral consequences in color-
judgment, thereby informing the neural
basis of language-augmented perception.
tDCS also has the potential to open up
additional domains to investigate effects of
language on cognition without the error-
fraught hunt for perfect control interfer-
ence tasks.
In sum, we advocate: (1) a more
systematic comparison of linguistic
perturbation methods, specifically com-
paring behavioral linguistic perturbations
to perturbations utilizing stimulation
techniques such as tDCS; (2) a more
rigorous comparison of different verbal
interference tasks; and (3) a theory that
elucidates the mechanisms by which ver-
bal interference actually works. Such an
examination will be critical to clarifying
the contributions of language to cogni-
tion, helping us answer such questions
as whether the mechanisms by which lan-
guage affects perception of color categories
are in some broad sense similar to mech-
anisms by which language affects spatial
cognition. Performing the cross-method
comparisons we advocate will highlight
possible contradictions leading to further
theoretical refinement. For example, what
would it mean for the underlying cognitive
and neural processes if one verbal inter-
ference method affects a primary task but
another does not?
The extant empirical literature on
effects of language on cognition and per-
ception takes us considerably beyond the
question as it is often phrased: “Does
language affect thought,” (Boroditsky,
2010a). This literature (e.g., Gentner and
Goldin-Meadow, 2003; Casasanto, 2008;
Boroditsky, 2010b; Lupyan, 2012a,b),
while rich in demonstrations, requires
a more rigorous investigation of the
mechanisms by which learning and
using language augment and perhaps
fundamentally alter cognition and per-
ception. We believe significant clarity
on this important question can be
achieved by combining creative uses
of linguistic perturbation techniques
with theoretical refinement of their
mechanisms.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We would like to thank Pierce Edmiston
for his comments on an earlier version of
this paper.
REFERENCES
Baddeley, A., Chincotta, D., and Adlam, A. (2001).
Working memory and the control of action:
evidence from task switching. J. Exp. Psychol.
Gen. 130, 641–657. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.130.
4.641
Boroditsky, L. (2010a). Do the languages we speak
shape the way we think? in The Economist.
Available online at: http://www.economist.com/
debate/overview/190
Boroditsky, L. (2010b). “How the languages we
speak shape the ways we think: the FAQs,” in
The Cambridge Handbook of Psycholinguistics,
eds M. J. Spivey, M. Joanisse, and K. McRae
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press),
615–632.
Casasanto, D. (2008). Who’s afraid of the big bad
whorf? Crosslinguistic differences in temporal lan-
guage and thought. Lang. Learn. 58, 63–79. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9922.2008.00462.x
Davidoff, J., and Roberson, D. (2004). Preserved the-
matic and impaired taxonomic categorisation: a
case study. Lang. Cogn. Processes 19, 137–174. doi:
10.1080/01690960344000125
de Vries, M. H., Barth, A. C. R., Maiworm, S.,
Knecht, S., Zwitserlood, P., and Flöel, A. (2010).
Electrical stimulation of Broca’s area enhances
implicit learning of an artificial grammar. J. Cogn.
Neurosci. 22, 2427–2436. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2009.
21385
Dungan, J., and Saxe, R. (2012). Matched false-
belief performance during verbal and nonver-
bal interference. Cogn. Sci. 36, 1148–1156. doi:
10.1111/j.1551-6709.2012.01248.x
Emerson, M. J., and Miyake, A. (2003). The role
of inner speech in task switching: a dual-task
investigation. J. Mem. Lang. 48, 148–168. doi:
10.1016/S0749-596X(02)00511-9
Flöel, A., Rösser, N., Michka, O., Knecht, S., and
Breitenstein, C. (2008). Noninvasive brain stimula-
tion improves language learning. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
20, 1415–1422. doi: 10.1162/jocn.2008.20098
Fonteneau, E., and Davidoff, J. (2007). Neural
correlates of colour categories. Neuroreport 18,
1323–1327. doi: 10.1097/WNR.0b013e3282c48c33
Frank, M. C., and Barner, D. (2012). Representing
exact number visually using mental abacus.
J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 141, 134–149. doi: 10.1037/
a0024427
Gentner, D., and Goldin-Meadow, S. (2003).
Language in Mind: Advances in the Study
of Language and Thought. Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press.
Gernsbacher, M. A., and Kaschak, M. P. (2003).
Neuroimaging studies of language production
and comprehension. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 54,
91–114. doi: 10.1146/annurev.psych.54.101601.
145128
Gilbert, A. L., Regier, T., Kay, P., and Ivry, R. B.
(2006). Whorf hypothesis is supported in the right
visual field but not the left. Proc. Natl. Acad.
Sci. U.S.A. 103, 489–494. doi: 10.1073/pnas.050986
8103
Hatano, G., Miyake, Y., and Binks, M. G. (1977).
Performance of expert abacus operators.
Cognition 5, 47–55. doi: 10.1016/0010-0277
(77)90016-6
Hermer, L., and Spelke, E. S. (1994). A geometric pro-
cess for spatial reorientation in young children.
Nature 370, 57–59. doi: 10.1038/370057a0
Hermer-Vazquez, L., Spelke, E. S., and Katsnelson,
A. S. (1999). Sources of flexibility in human cog-
nition: dual-task studies of space and language.
Cogn. Psychol. 39, 3–36. doi: 10.1006/cogp.1998.
0713
Jung-Beeman, M. (2005). Bilateral brain processes
for comprehending natural language. Trends Cogn.
Sci. 9, 512–518. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2005.09.009
Lupyan, G. (2008). The conceptual grouping
effect: categories matter (and named categories
matter more). Cognition 108, 566–577. doi:
10.1016/j.cognition.2008.03.009
Lupyan, G. (2009). Extracommunicative functions of
language: verbal interference causes selective cat-
egorization impairments. Psychon. Bull. Rev. 16,
711–718. doi: 10.3758/PBR.16.4.711
Lupyan, G. (2012a). “What do words do? Toward
a theory of language-augmented thought,” in
The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Vol.
57, ed B. H. Ross (San Diego, CA: Academic
Press), 255–297. doi: 10.1016/B978-0-12-394293-
7.00007-8
Lupyan, G. (2012b). Linguistically modulated
perception and cognition: the label-feedback
hypothesis. Front. Cogn. 3:54. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.
2012.00054
Lupyan, G., and Mirman, D. (2013). Linking language
and categorization: evidence from aphasia. Cortex
49, 1187–1194. doi: 10.1016/j.cortex.2012.06.006
Lupyan, G., and Swingley, D. (2012). Self-directed
speech affects visual search performance.Q. J. Exp.
Psychol. 65, 1068–1085. doi: 10.1080/17470218.
2011.647039
Lupyan, G., Mirman, D., Hamilton, R., and
Thompson-Schill, S. L. (2012). Categorization is
modulated by transcranial direct current stimu-
lation over left prefrontal cortex. Cognition 124,
36–49. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2012.04.002
Lupyan, G., Rakison, D. H., and McClelland, J. L.
(2007). Language is not just for talking: redun-
dant labels facilitate learning of novel categories.
Psychol. Sci. 18, 1077–1083. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-
9280.2007.02028.x
MacDonald, M. C., Pearlmutter, N. J., and Seidenberg,
M. S. (1994). The lexical nature of syntactic ambi-
guity resolution. Psychol. Rev. 101, 676–703. doi:
10.1037/0033-295X.101.4.676
Newton, A. M., and de Villiers, J. G. (2007).
Thinking while talking: adults fail nonverbal false-
belief reasoning. Psychol. Sci. 18, 574–579. doi:
10.1111/j.1467-9280.2007.01942.x
Özgen, E., and Davies, I. R. (2002). Acquisition
of categorical color perception: a perceptual
learning approach to the linguistic rela-
tivity hypothesis. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 131,
477–493. doi: 10.1037/0096-3445.131.4.477
Price, C. J. (2000). The anatomy of language: con-
tributions from functional neuroimaging. J. Anat.
197, 335–359. doi: 10.1046/j.1469-7580.2000.1973
0335.x
Roberson, D., Damjanovic, L., and Pilling, M. (2007).
Categorical perception of facial expressions:
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 122 | 3
Perry and Lupyan Linguistic manipulation
evidence for a “category adjustment” model.
Mem. Cogn. 35, 1814–1829. doi: 10.3758/BF0319
3512
Ting Siok, W., Kay, P., Wang, W. S. Y., Chan, A. H.
D., Chen, L., Luke, K.-K., et al. (2009). Language
regions of brain are operative in color perception.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 106, 8140–8145. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0903627106
Twyman, A. D., and Newcombe, N. S. (2010). Five
reasons to doubt the existence of a geometric mod-
ule. Cogn. Sci. 34, 1315–1356. doi: 10.1111/j.1551-
6709.2009.01081.x
Winawer, J., Witthoft, N., Frank, M. C., Wu, L., Wade,
A. R., and Boroditsky, L. (2007). Russian blues
reveal effects of language on color discrimination.
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 7780–7785. doi:
10.1073/pnas.0701644104
Received: 15 July 2013; accepted: 29 August 2013;
published online: 17 September 2013.
Citation: Perry LK and Lupyan G (2013) What the
online manipulation of linguistic activity can tell us
about language and thought. Front. Behav. Neurosci.
7:122. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2013.00122
This article was submitted to the journal Frontiers in
Behavioral Neuroscience.
Copyright © 2013 Perry and Lupyan. This is an
open-access article distributed under the terms of the
Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The
use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is
permitted, provided the original author(s) or licen-
sor are credited and that the original publication
in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted
academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduc-
tion is permitted which does not comply with these
terms.
Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org September 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 122 | 4
